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Abstract
Background/Introduction
RA flooding attack aims to exhaust all node resources, such as CPU and
memory, attached to routers on the same link. A biologically-inspired ma-
chine learning based approach is proposed in this study to detect RA flooding
attacks.
Methods
The proposed technique exploits information gain ratio (IGR) and Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA) for feature selection and a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) based predictor model, which can also detect input traffic
anomaly.
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Results
A real benchmark dataset obtained from National Advanced IPv6 Center of
Excellence laboratory is used to evaluate the proposed technique. The evalua-
tion process is conducted with two experiments. The first experiment investi-
gates the effect of IGR and PCA feature selection methods to identify the most
contributed features for the SVM training model. The second experiment eval-
uates the capability of SVM to detect RA flooding attacks. The results show
that the proposed technique demonstrates excellent detection accuracy and is
thus an effective choice for detecting RA flooding attacks.
Conclusions
The main contribution of this study is identification of a set of new features
that are related to RA flooding attack by utilizing IGR and PCA algorithms.
The proposed technique in this paper can effectively detect the presence of
RA flooding attack in IPv6 network.
Keywords RA flooding attack · Network security · IGR · PCA · SVM · IPv6
security
1 Introduction
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is the next-generation Internet protocol
expected to replace the current IPv4 protocol. IPv6 presents a number of im-
provements and simplifications compared with IPv4. The primary difference
between the two is that IPv6 uses 128 bit addresses, whereas IPv4 uses 32
bit ones. Furthermore, IPv6 ships with a new protocol called neighbor discov-
ery protocol (NDP) that introduces new security vulnerabilities, which allow
attackers to easily attack IPv6 networks [1, 2]. The security community has
built new tools and experimented with new IPv6 security methods to perform
IPv6 network penetration testing; one of these tools is The Hackers’ Choice,
which is commonly called the THC-IPv6 toolkit [3]. IPv6 possesses new se-
curity vulnerabilities in addition to those inherent in current IPv4 networks.
Most security vulnerabilities are presented in the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
[4].
NDP in IPv6 is similar to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in IPv4 [5].
The main purposes of both protocols are to locate the media access control
(MAC) address of the destination host in the same local network and identify
the MAC address of the router to communicate with a node in an external
network. Consequently, actual exchange of messages can occur between the
two nodes. In IPv6, NDP uses ICMPv6 type field values ranging from 133 to
137 to achieve its purpose [6]. Table 1 presents the NDP-related ICMPv6 type
field values and their use. NDP is a stateless protocol that lacks authentication
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of its messages by default. This lack of authenticity and statelessness result in
many possible attacks, such as router advertisement [7].
Table 1: NDP related ICMPv6 Type
ICMPv6 packet type Description
Router Solicitation(RS)-Type
133
Message sent by host to request a router to send a router
advertisement.
Router Advertisement(RA)-
Type 134
Routers advertise their presence together with various links
and Internet parameters either periodically or in response to
an RS message.
Neighbor Solicitation(NS)-
Type 135
Neighbor solicitations are used by nodes to determine the link
layer address of a neighbor or to verify that a neighbor is still
reach- able via a cached link layer address. .
Neighbor Advertisement(NA)-
Type 136
NA message sent by nodes to respond to an NS message.
Redirect-Type 137 Routers may inform hosts of a better first hop router for a
destination.
Unlike the IPv4 network, IPv6 provides minimal options to detect NDP-
based attacks because the IPv6 protocol is relatively new and has gradually
become common. Security researchers have conducted extensive studies and
have designed important tools for IPv6
Several successful machine learning techniques, namely, principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA), information gain ratio (IGR), and support vector ma-
chine (SVM), have been applied to detect IPv4-based attacks [8, 9, 10, 11].
However, existing machine learning techniques applied in IPv4 networks can-
not be utilized to detect RA flooding attacks since these methods cannot locate
and inspect ICMPv6, given that the structure of IPv6 is different from that of
IPv4. As a result, RA flooding attacks can bypass these methods. In this study,
a new technique is developed to detect the presence of RA flooding attacks in
IPv6 networks. This technique is a combination of IGR, PCA, and SVM. IGR
and PCA are feature reduction techniques used to select a set of new features
that has significant contributions in detecting RA flooding attacks, and SVM
utilizes the results of IGR and PCA to train a prediction model. Consequently,
the anomaly of input traffic can be detected with this model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review
of NDP based attacks and machine learning techniques. Section 3 reviews
the previous literatures related to RA flooding attacks. Section 4 describes
the proposed technique to detect RA flooding attacks. Section 5 presents an
evaluation of the proposed technique, and Section 6 provides the conclusions
and possible future research directions.
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2 Background
The problem is ICMPv6 flooding attacks (RA flooding) in IPv6 networks, and
the methods are IGR, PCA, and SVM
2.1 ICMPv6 flooding attacks (RA flooding)
IPv6 routers use NDP to discover one another’s presence and determine link-
layer addresses and prefix information. A receiving node does not validate
router advertisements. Thus, any node that receives a fake RA updates its
communication parameters blindly based on the RA. A malicious node can
propagate bogus address prefix information to reroute legitimate traffic and
prevent the victim from accessing the desired network [12, 13]. Flooding a local
network with a different network prefix and having hosts and routers update
the network parameters with information based on the announced prefix would
consume all available CPU and memory resources, thus rendering the system
unusable and unresponsive.
Given that the IPv6 protocol is enabled by default in most modern operat-
ing systems, all nodes in the network are affected in their default configuration.
For example, in Windows, a personal firewall or a similar security product is
not protected against an RA flooding attack.
An RA message is sent to the FF02::1 multi-cast group so that all hosts on
the same link receive the announced fake prefix. In turn, these hosts configure
their default gateway based on the fake announced prefix. A flag in IPv6 router
advertisements determines the default router preference. First, by default, the
legitimate router sends out RA messages with the router preference flag set to
”medium”.
Fake RA messages commonly set the preference flag to ”high,” thus forcing
the hosts to use it as their default gateway. Changing the preference flag value
is a normal procedure. However, signature-based techniques cannot differenti-
ate between legitimate and non-legitimate RA messages.
The attacker sends a large number of RA messages to all hosts on the
same link. Consequently, the nodes’ resources are consumed because these
nodes continue to generate a new IPv6 address for each announced prefix. .
2.2 IGR
IGR [14] depends on the entropy algorithm [15] that measures the disorder
in a system and the information gain that measures the decrease in entropy
achieved in the classification based on a particular feature.The purpose of using
IGR is to identify important and effective features to detect an RA flooding
attack. IGR assigns the important and effective features with a large weight
value. In contrast, the less important features are assigned with small weight
value. In the equations below, Ex is the set of all training data examples,
value(x, f) with x ∈ Ex defines the value of a specific example x.Hence,
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IGR(Ex, f) =
Gain(Ex, f)
SplitInfo(Ex, f)
(1)
Gain(Ex, f) = Entropy(Ex)−
∑
v∈value(f)
|Exv|
|Ex| × Entropy(Exv),
Exv =
{
x ∈ Ex
value(x, f)
}
= v
The entropy function is the Shannon’s entropy that is defined as
Entropy (Ex) = −
∑
Pi log2 (Pi) (2)
where Pi is the probability of class i.
The split information value, SplitInfo(Ex, f), that represents the poten-
tial information generated by splitting the training data set Ex into v parti-
tions, corresponding to v outcomes on attribute f is defined as
SplitInfo(Ex, f) = −
ν∑
i=1
|Exi|
|Ex| × log2
|Exi|
|Ex| (3)
where Exi is the set of all training examples in partition i. The attribute
with the maximum gain ratio is s split attribute.
2.3 PCA
PCA is a well-developed method to reduce dimensionality and multivariate
analysis. Examples of its applications include data compression, image pro-
cessing, visualization, exploratory data analysis, pattern recognition, and time
series prediction [16, 17, 18].
PCA is a mathematical method that transforms a number of possibly corre-
lated variables into a new set of uncorrelated variables called principal compo-
nents. The first principal component has the highest variability in the dataset.
In many datasets, the first several principal components have the highest con-
tribution to the variance in the original dataset. Therefore, the rest can be
disregarded with minimal loss of the information value during the dimension
reduction process[19].
PCA is popular because of its three important properties. First, it is an
optimal (in terms of mean squared error) linear scheme for compressing a set
of high-dimensional vectors into a set of low-dimensional vectors and then re-
constructing the original set. Second, the model parameters can be computed
directly from the data, similar to the example of digitalizing the sample co-
variance matrix. Third, compression and decompression are easy to perform
with given model parameters. They require only matrix multiplication.
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Given a set of observations xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xin),∀i ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,m) where
each observation is represented by a vector of length n, the data set is repre-
sented by a matrix Xn×m
Xn,m =

x11 x12 · · · x1n
x21 x22 · · · x2n
...
...
. . .
...
xm1 xm2 · · · xmn
 = [x1,x2, · · · ,xn] (4)
The mean is defined by the expected value, as presented in Equation (5).
m =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi (5)
The covariance matrix is defined as
∑
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(xi −m)× (xi −m)t (6)
The covariance matrix is one of the most important mathematical concepts
in data analysis. If the data in the new coordinate system are presented by y,
then linear transformation G of the original coordinates should be determined,
as presented in Equation 7.
y = Gx = Dt × x (7)
Replacing G with Dt would make any further comparison of principal com-
ponents with other transformation methods much simpler. The covariance ma-
trix in the y space is defined by Equation(8):∑
y = Dt ×
∑
x×D (8)
where
∑
x is the covariance of the data in x space. Since
∑
y needs to be
diagonal, D can be recognized as the matrix of eigenvectors of
∑
x, providing
D is an orthogonal matrix.
∑
y is a diagonal matrix shown in (9). Thus,
∑
y
can be identified as the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of
∑
x.
∑
y =

λ1 0 · · · 0
0 λ2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · λn
 (9)
We let n be the dimensionality of the data.
The covariance matrix is used to calculate diagonal matrix y. y is sorted
and rearranged in the form of n as (λ1 > λ2 > . . . > λn) so that the data
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exhibits the maximum variance in y1, the next largest variance in y2, and so
on (with minimum variance in yn).
This feature extraction problem has been studied by many researchers. For
example, Xu et al. [20] selected eight relative values as features that are in-
dependent of network flow. Zargar et al. [21] proposed and investigated the
identification of effective network features to probe attack detection using the
PCA method to determine an optimal feature set (e.g., principal component
analysis, factor analysis, projection pursuit, and independent component anal-
ysis). In the current work, PCA was employed because of its ideal mean-square
error and linear dimension reduction technique [18].
2.4 SVM
SVM is a powerful machine learning approach that has been employed, both in
its original and variant forms, in a range of challenging real-world applications
[22]. The simplest SVM model addresses the binary classification problem that
is separated by a hyperplane defined by a number of support vectors. Support
vectors are subsets of training data used to define the boundary between two
different classes, namely, RA attack and normal. In situations where SVM
cannot separate two classes, the input data are mapped into high-dimensional
feature spaces using a kernel function. In a high-dimensional space, creating
a hyperplane that allows linear separation is possible; this hyperplane corre-
sponds to a curved surface in low-dimensional input space. The kernel function
plays an important role in SVM [18, 10].
In practice, various kernel functions, such as linear, polynomial, or radial
basis function (RBF), can be utilized. Figure 1 shows the basic idea behind the
use of kernel functions by SVMs. In Figure 1 , the original objects (left side of
the schematic) are mapped, that is, rearranged, by using a set of mathemat-
ical functions known as kernels. The process of rearranging these objects is
known as mapping (transformation). In this new setting, the mapped objects
(right side of the schematic) are linearly separable. Instead of constructing the
complex curve (left schematic), an optimal line is fixed to separate GREEN
and RED objects.
We suppose thatN training data points (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3), . . . , (xn, yn),
exist.
xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ {+1, 1}. We consider a hyperplane defined by (w, b),
where w is a weight vector and b is a bias.
If the training data are linearly separable, then pair (w, b) ∈ Rn×R exists,
such that
wTx+ b > 1 ∀x ∈ A (10)
wTx+ b ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ B (11)
with the decision function given by
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Fig. 1: Mapping input space to feature space
f(x)w,b = sin(w
Tx+ b) (12)
Where w is the weight vector and b is the bias. The inequality constraints,
Equations (11) and (12) can be combined to obtain
y(wTx+ b) > 1 ∀ x ∈ A ∪B (13)
The maximal margin classifier optimizes this condition by separating the
data with the maximal margin hyperplane. The learning problem is thus for-
mulated as minimize 12‖w‖2 subject to the constraints of linear separability.
The optimization is a quadratic programming (QP) problem:
minw,bφ(w) =
1
2
‖w‖2
s.t. y(wTx+ b) > 1
(14)
K(Xi, Xj) =

Xi.Xj linear
(γXi.Xj + c)
d Polynominal
exp(−γ|Xi −Xj |2) RBF
tanh(γXi.Xj + c) Sigmoid
 (15)
where K(Xi, Xj) = φ(Xi) · (Xj), that is, the kernel function, represents a
dot product of input data points mapped into the higher dimensional feature
space by transformation φ. where γ is an adjustable parameter of certain kernel
functions.
3 Related Work
Similar to IPv4 headers, IPv6 headers possess no security mechanisms. IPsec is
available in IPv6. Administrators rely on the IPsec protocol suite for security.
The same security risks for Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks in Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) in IPv4 are also present in IPv6 [23].
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An IPsec authentication header (AH) can be used with NDP (NS/NA)
messages to enhance security and verify that messages contain proper and
accurate information. Security associations (SAs) can be created only through
IKE. However, IKE requires a functional IP stack to function, which results in a
bootstrapping problem. SA can only be configured manually, which is a tedious
or impractical task because of the volume. Even when SAs are established,
verifying the ownership of dynamically generated IP addresses is impossible
[23].
Mechanism to secure NDP with a cryptographic method that is indepen-
dent of IPsec (the original and inherent method of securing IPv6 communi-
cations) is called Secure Neighbor Discovery(SEND). SEND was introduced
to prevent address theft by proposing cryptographically generated addresses
(CGA) and protecting data with an RSA signature [24]. Numerous researchers
[25] reported that the use of SEND is complex and may causea DoS attack
on the target node because of the high complexity and computation involved
in encryption and decryption processes, which negatively affect the node re-
sources.
The NDP Monitor (NDPMon) is a diagnostic software application used by
IPv6 network administrators to monitor ICMPv6 packets. NDPMon monitors
the local network for anomalies in the function of nodes using NDP messages,
especially during stateless address auto-configuration. When an NDP message
is flagged, NDPMon notifies the administrator by writing to the system log or
by sending an email report. NDPMon may also execute a user-defined script
[26].
IPv6 RA Monitoring Daemon [27] monitors ND traffic to detect possible
attacks when discrepancies exist between the information advertised in ND
packets and the information stored on a local database. A key challenge in
this detection mechanism is the introduction of IPv6 fragmentation. Conceal-
ing an attack by fragmenting packets into multiple fragments is simple. This
condition may limit or even eliminate the effectiveness of the aforementioned
detection mechanism. The main drawbacks of these passive schemes are lack
of dynamism, scalability, false alarms, and violation of protocol stack.
Barbhuiya et al [1] adapted the basic idea of active IDS [28] and applied it
to NDP-related attacks. The change in the new MAC-IP pair can be detected
by sending an NS request packet to the target host to inquire if the MAC-IP
pair is genuine or spoofed. If the MAC-IP pair is genuine, the host will respond
with a corresponding NA reply packet. If the MAC-IP pair is spoofed, no reply
(if the IP address is nonexistent) or multiple replies (from the genuine host
and attacker) may be generated. The proposed mechanism focuses on detecting
two types of NDP-related attacks, namely, NS and NA spoofing
Saad, et al. [29] proposed rules to detect the abnormal behavior of ICMPv6.
The back-propagation neural network (BPNN) algorithm was employed to
verify the abnormal behaviors detected by the proposed rules; these abnor-
mal behaviors are a result of the presence of an ICMPv6-based DDoS at-
tack. The experimental result showed that the proposed technique can detect
ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks with a detection accuracy of 98.3%. However,
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the proposed technique focuses only on detecting ICMPv6 echo request flood-
ing attacks. In addition, the proposed technique uses features that are not
effective in detecting ICMPv6 flooding attacks when operating online. For ex-
ample, time and source IP address features and training data are collected
until time t, whereas the classifier operates online to detect the attack after t.
This scenario leads to misclassification of the incoming network traffic. Fur-
thermore, the classifier uses the source IPs as indicators during model training.
Therefore, any IP that does not exist within the range of IPs in the training
model are incorrectly classified
RA guard technique was proposed and explained in RFC 6105 [30] in 2011
to handle rogue RAs generated maliciously or unintentionally by unauthorized
or improperly configured routers or devices. RA guard is installed in layer-2
switches to analyze RA messages and to filter out RAs that are sent by unau-
thorized devices based on certain criteria. It compares its criteria with selected
information extracted from IPv6 frames, such as MAC source address, phys-
ical port, IPv6 source, and prefix list. The decision of the RA Guard-enabled
switch to discard or forward the RA message will be based on the comparison
result. The determination can be based either on layer-2 configurations with
configured access rules or on dynamically learning procedures of RA senders
during a learning period.
Thus, RA Guard prevents DoS attacks that are based on RA messages
only and this is one of its drawbacks. Moreover, it has more shortcomings as
explained in [31, 32] that prevented widespread adoption of RA guard. Those
limitations are: (1) RA guard does not provide any security protection for
devices connecting wirelessly such as WiFi devices. (2) RA guard does not
offer protection for the egress direction of traffic since it only monitors ingress
traffic in switch ports. (3) RA guard cannot be used on trunk ports with merge
mode of ports. (4) Common and low-end switches do not typically support RA
guard functionalities; therefore, additional cost is required to replace existing
switches with newer and more expensive hardwares.
RFC7113 [31] was created in 2014 to describe two evasion techniques that
affect some implementation of RA Guard. It also updates the original RA
Guard specification, RFC6105 to eliminate the evasion vectors in those imple-
mentation. RA guard filtration can be circumvented using a combination of
fragmented packets and extension header with the RA message. The use of
fragmentation with extension header makes it impossible for layer-2 device to
identify RA messages since reassembly of fragmented packet is not performed
at layer-2.
SEND-based RA Guard was proposed to complement SEND in securing
IPv6 local network in the environment where SEND might not be suitable or
fully supported by all device in the network. An RA Guard-enabled switch
acts as a node-in-the-middle, where upon capturing an RA packet at its in-
terface, uses information from SEND to authenticate packet by verifying the
CGA and RSA signature of the sender [30]. However due to the complexity
of router authorization mechanisms in SEND, AlSa’deh recommended alter-
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native method of using Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) with
RA-Guard to prevent address theft and detect fake RAs [25].
4 Proposed Technique
The proposed technique aims to detect RA flooding attacks in an IPv6 link
local network. An RA message appears in the network in the form of ICMPv6
(Type 134). A router in an IPv6 network periodically sends an RA message
that contains network prefix lifetime and configuration type to all nodes on
the same link. The IPv6 node can induce the router to send an RA message by
sending the RS to the FF02::2 multi-cast group. Once the IPv6 nodes config-
ured their routing table and IPv6 address based on the RA and implanted a de-
fault gateway, a receiving node does not validate the RA. Thus, any node that
receives a fake RA updates its communication parameters blindly based on the
received RA. Figure 2 shows the three consecutive phases of the proposed tech-
nique, namely, filtering, feature reduction, and detection. These three phases
are discussed thoroughly in the following subsections.
Fig. 2: The architecture of the proposed technique
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4.1 Filtering phase
This phase deals with the voluminous amount of IPv6 network traffic. This
traffic contains different types of protocols that do not contribute to the detec-
tion of RA flooding attacks. Thus, the incoming traffic is filtered into ICMP
type 134 (RA). The filtering phase consists of one log table, which is used to log
the ICMP type 134 features, such as time, source IP, destination IP,protocol,
and packet size. The usefulness and importance of the filtered features are
verified in the next phase. Figure 3 shows the flowchart for the filtering phase.
We suppose that series of packets ξ =(xi, xi+1, . . . xk) exist, where i refers
to the number of incoming packets. For each packet xi=(fj , fj+1, . . . , fN )
where j = 1, 2, . . . , N refers to the packet features number for each ξ out of
N features. The important features, m, that contribute to detecting the RA
flooding attack is m < N. In the filtering phase, the extracted features m are
logged into log table V , as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Filtering algorithm
ρ ={Source IP address, Destination IP address, Packet size, ICMPv6 Type, Time, Flow
Label, Hop Limit, Traffic Class, Payload Length}
for i = 1 to k do
for j = 1 to N do
if fj ∈ ρ then
add fj to V
end if
end for
end for
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Fig. 3: The flowchart of Filtering Phase
4.2 Features reduction phase
In the filtering phase, m features for ICMP type 134 (RA) were saved into
the log table. The features reduction phase selects the most contributed m
features that reflect all the filtered features. The main advantage of the feature
reduction phase is that it increases the detection accuracy for RA flooding
attacks. The feature reduction phase consists of three sub-steps: IGR-based
feature ranking, PCA-based feature extraction, and feature intersection.
4.2.1 IGR-based feature ranking
Features ranking is achieved by the new proposed technique to identify impor-
tant and effective features to detect an RA flooding attack. One of the most
effective algorithms used in feature ranking is IGR.
In IGR-based feature ranking, each filtered feature in log table xi(fj),
where ∀i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , k) and ∀j ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,m) is assigned a weight value.
IGR(xi, fj), based on Equation (1) in Section 2.2.
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The features fj with a large weight value is highly important. By contrast,
features with small weight value reflect low importance. For example, the fea-
ture with a zero weight value is disregarded from the extracted feature list.
Therefore, the extracted feature list is δ1 = {f1, f2, . . . , fr}. The output list is
then used as an input for features intersection step.
4.2.2 PCA-based feature selection
In this step, PCA is adopted to reduce the dimensionality of the data and
to select only the significant features. PCA is used to select an independent
set of features. The resultant features will be used as input for next step, if
a set of features are selected only by IGR or PCA then these features will
not be considered as significant features. Therefore, feature intersection step
is proposed to make sure that selected features are selected by IGR and PCA.
PCA is a popular method of feature selection [33] and is widely used in
dimensionality reduction for data analysis and compression. PCA transforms
a relatively large number of variables into a small number of uncorrelated vari-
ables. This transformation is implemented by fixed orthogonal linear combina-
tions of the original variables with the largest variance. In feature extraction,
a subset of relevant features is extracted from the total number of features in
the dataset and used to build the RA detection phase (discussed in Section
4.3). The extracted feature list is δ2 = {f1, f2, . . . , fr1}, where r1 ≤ m is the
output of this phase.
4.2.3 Features intersection step
Improving the prediction performance provides fast and cost- effective predic-
tors and improved understanding of the underlying process that generates the
data. RA flooding attack detection accuracy increases by selecting the correct
and most contributed features relevant to the RA flooding attack. Feature
intersection selects the features that exist in the output of both feature rank-
ing step δ1 (Section 4.2.1) and feature selection step δ2 (Section 4.2.2) and
excludes the rest of the features. The intersection of the result provided by
several selection and ranking techniques may lead to a highly accurate feature
list. The features intersection phase is defined as follows:
We assume two different sets δ1 and δ2. δ3 = δ1
⋂
δ2, where δ3 is the result
of intersection, δ1 represents the set of features obtained from the IGR-based
feature ranking step, and δ2 represents the set of features obtained from the
PCA-based feature selection step. The output of this phase is the features that
exist in feature ranking and feature selection steps.
4.3 SVM Detection phase
To detect the presence of an RA flooding attack in an IPv6 network, supervised
learning should be considered in the measurement, in which the observation of
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the target function is known. The attack detection process is suggested to be
the target function f(x) = yi, where yi = {normal, attack}. SVM is adopted
as a training algorithm. The process of separating genuine from malicious
ones is based on the training model that contains the genuine packets only.
The network administrator trains the target network in an oﬄine manner to
come up with a solid detection model. Then, SVM operates online based on
the trained model to detect the RA flooding attack. SVM aims to identify
the optimal hyperplane that separates classes of yi by using the RBF kernel
function presented in Equation (15). RBF is the most popular choice of kernel
type used in SVM because of its localized and fixed responses across the entire
range of the real x-axis [34, 35]. This phase uses the selected features from the
feature reduction phase. These features consist of both attack and normal
traffic to be used for SVM training. The output of this phase is the training
model. This model is subsequently utilized to detect the RA flooding attack
from any input traffic. Figure 4 shows the main process of SVM.
Fig. 4: The Process of SVM-based detection Phase
As shown in Figure 4, SVM uses a subset of the input dataset as the
training model. The number of features for the trained dataset is equal to the
number of features of δ3, and the number of features for the testing dataset
may or may not be equal to the number of features of δ3. Having less or more
features for training dataset will lead to negative impact (such as low accuracy
detection).
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The main contribution of applying IGR, PCA, and SVM techniques in
IPv6 networks is to reveal their capabilities in detecting new security issues
(RA flooding attacks in this study) that exist in IPv6 networks; while the
difference between applying these techniques in IPv4 and IPv6 networks is
the selection of the nominated features that highly contribute to detecting
RA flooding attacks. Given that each attack has related features that help in
the detection, these features would most probably be selected in the proposed
technique. Therefore, the benefit of the proposed technique is to select a set
of significant features that lead to accurate detection of the presence of RA
flooding attack.
At this stage, the proposed technique focuses on the detection accuracy for
RA flooding rather than memory and CPU complexities. CPU and memory
complexities have a linear correlation with the number of packets captured
and analyzed. To prevent CPU and memory saturation, a high-end server
architecture can be employed to perform packet capturing and analysis while
keeping the processing time low. Using the feature reduction phase leads to an
improved SVM training model that can accurately detect RA flooding attacks
from input traffic.
5 Experiment Evaluation
This section evaluates the robustness of the proposed technique in detecting
the presence of RA flooding attacks. A real dataset is used to evaluate the
proposed technique. The characteristic of the real dataset is provided in Sec-
tion 5.1. Experiments are conducted to mature the output of this phase by
using the simulated dataset presented in Section 5.2 because the main contri-
bution of this study is the process of selecting the reduction features in phase
2. The accuracy of detecting RA flooding attacks from input traffic data is
experimentally measured using the simulated dataset in Section 5.3.
5.1 Dataset definition
The proposed technique is evaluated with a real dataset with a total of 199,138
different time-stamped row packets of both RA attack and normal traffic. Nor-
mal traffic is obtained from the National Advanced IPv6 Center of Excellence
(NAv6)[36], and the RA attacks are obtained from an isolated testbed to
avoid the propagation of the attacks to the real network. A GNS3 simulator
is used to design the topology of the testbed (Figure 5), which consists of six
IPv6-enabled hosts as listed in Table 2. The THC-IPv6 toolkit is employed
to launch an RA flooding attack. The generated traffic consists of fake RA
messages (generated by the THC toolkit) and legitimate RA messages (gener-
ated by the legitimate router, as shown in Figure 5). The difference between
the generated and detected attack numbers is that the generated represents
the entire traffic that bypassed the designed topology while the detected at-
tack represents the traffic that have fake RA message. The entire traffic that
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bypassed the network is captured with the Wireshark sniffer tool [37]. There-
fore, the captured traffic from the testbed along with real traffic from NAv6
are merged to be the input for the proposed technique. Table 3 shows the
specifications of the machine used for training and detection.
Fig. 5: Test bed topology
Table 2: Hosts in the designed topology
PC name Usage OS type
PC1 Normal user Windows 7
PC2 Normal user Windows XP
PC3 Normal user Ubuntu
PC4 Normal user Windows 7
Attacker Utilizes THC-IPv6 tool to trigger an RA flood-
ing attack
Backtrack 5 R3
Monitoring PC Sniffs all the packets that bypass the network. Windows XP
Table 3: Machine specifications
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q8400 @ 2.67GHz
Memory 5.00 GB
Operating System Windows 7 (64 bit)
18 Mohammed Anbar et al.
The dataset attributes that represent the features of δ3 values are normal-
ized. The conversion of non-integer features (Traffic Class, ICMPv6 Type, Hop
Limit, Flow Label features) is done by extracting the distinct values for each
feature and assign each distinct value a unique integer number The remaining
Payload Length size attribute value is unchanged.
5.2 Features reduction phase
The initial set of features, m, consists of nine features based on Algorithm 1.
The selection of the most significant features among these nine features is cru-
cial. Relying on simple heuristics to select the significant features may lead to
inappropriate feature selection, which reduces the detection accuracy for RA
flooding attack. In addition, using the entire set of features without any reduc-
tion is resource consuming. Thus, IGR and PCA are employed independently
on the dataset, which includes m features to reduce the high-dimensional data
vectors. Therefore, detection is handled in a low-dimensional space with high
efficiency and minimal use of system resources. The features that exist in the
output of both PCA and IGR are considered the significant features that con-
tribute to proper detection of RA flooding attacks. The effectiveness of the
selected features is demonstrated in Section 5.3 by using a real dataset.
The experiment for PCA and IGR was conducted using RapidMiner [38]
with their default parameters setting. The features in Table 4 are the experi-
mental results of extracting features using IGR. Table 5 shows the experimen-
tal results of extracting features using PCA.
Table 4: Output of IGR
Attribute Weight
Length 0.854
Source IP 0.787
Traffic Class 0.586
ICMPv6 Type 0.493
Flow Label 0.455
Hop Limit 0.455
Payload Length 0.455
Time 0.346
Destination IP 0.257
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Table 5: Output of PCA
Attribute Weight
Flow Label 0.435
Hop Limit 0.434
Payload Length 0.427
Traffic Class 0.425
ICMPv6 Type 0.361
Time 0.0
Destination IP -0.138
Source IP -0.167
Length -0.282
δ1 = {Length, Source IP, Traffic Class, ICMPv6 Type,Hop Limit, F low Label,
T ime, Payload Length, IP Destination}, where δ1 represents features that
ranked by IGR.
δ2 = {Traffic Class, ICMPv6 Type,Hop Limit, F low Label, Payload Length},
where δ2 represents features that ranked by PCA.
δ3 = δ1
⋂
δ2, where δ3 represents the result of features reduction phase.
δ3 = {Traffic Class, ICMPv6 Type,Hop Limit, F low Label, Payload Length}.
As a result, features ∈ δ3 have a high impact in detecting RA flooding,
whereas the remaining features are negligible because the weight is equal to
0, as shown in Table 4, or because of the standard deviation that is equal to
0, as shown in Table 5.
5.3 Detection phase
In this phase, the training model is created through SVM. The training model
is divided into training dataset1 and training dataset2. Training dataset1 is
generated with δ3 features, and training dataset2 is generated using the original
set of features m. The purpose of the diversity in training datasets is to test the
robustness of the technique in detecting the presence of RA flooding attacks
in IPv6 networks and to study the effect of selected features on the detection
process.Table 6 shows the details of the testing datasets. Figure 6 depicts the
evaluation of the proposed technique in term of the accuracy and false positive
rate while Figure 7 depicts the evaluation of the proposed technique in term
of the precision and recall rate.
Table 6: Details of the datasets
Dataset # of row packets
Training Dataset1 199138
Training Dataset2 199138
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The observed effect of training dataset size on the false positive rate (FPR)
is slightly different. The mean of FPR increases slightly and the variance de-
creases as the training dataset size increases. This result indicates that in the
case of FPR, small training sets can be used to produce low FPRs. The false
negative rate (FNR) and FPR statistics demonstrate that using large train-
ing sets entails minimal benefits [39]. The output of this phase is utilized to
measure the accuracy, false positive, precision, and recall of the proposed tech-
nique. Accuracy is a criterion used to measure IDS performance. The number
of false alarms the system produces and the percentage of detection and failure
are correctly declared. According to [40], a system that has 80% accuracy may
be a system that properly classifies 80 cases out of the 100 existing classes. The
standard formula to calculate the accuracy of detecting RA flooding attacks
is shown in Equation (16), and the calculation of FPR is shown in Equation
(17).
The calculation of precision is shown in Equation (18). Equation (19) is
used to calculate the Recall. Table 7 presents a description of each metric in
the accuracy equation.
Accuracy =
(
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
)
∗ 100 (16)
FPR =
(
FP
TN + FP
)
∗ 100 (17)
PRECISION (P) is the proportion of attack cases that are correctly pre-
dicted relative to the predicted size of the attack class as calculated using the
following equation
PRECISION =
(
TP
TP + FP
)
∗ 100 (18)
RECALL (R) is the proportion of correctly predicted attack cases to the
actual size of the attack class as calculated using the following equation
RECALL =
(
TP
TP + FN
)
∗ 100 (19)
Table 7: Description of accuracy metrics
Metric Description
True positive (TP) Number of samples correctly predicted as attack class
False positive (FP) Number of samples incorrectly predicted as attack class
True negative (TN) Number of samples correctly predicted as normal class
False negative (FN) Number of samples incorrectly predicted as normal class.
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Fig. 6: Accuracy vs False positive
As shown in Figure 6, the proposed technique can detect the presence of an
RA flooding attack by using the features δ3 selected in the feature reduction
phase. The detection accuracy is 98.55%, and the FPR is 3.3%. Accuracy
decreases to 94.93% with an FPR of 4.2% when the set of original features m
is used. Therefore, the high accuracy of the proposed technique is attributed
to the proposed feature reduction methods. Such methods aim to select the
most important features that contribute to the detection of the RA flooding
attack.
Fig. 7: Precision vs Recall
As shown in Figure 7, the proposed technique with the selected features δ3
has a higher precision percentage (99.1%) compared to proposed techniques
with the original set of features, which means that it has lower false-positive
value. Meanwhile, the proposed technique with the selected features δ3 has a
higher recall percentage (99.51%) compared to proposed techniques with the
original set of features, which means that it has lower false-negative value.
The robustness of SVM as a training model is achieved, as revealed by the
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highly accurate results in detecting the RA flooding attack. Ignoring one of
the selected features would negatively affect the accuracy of the proposed
technique.
The biologically inspired algorithms have been utilized to enhance the per-
formance of machine learning algorithms [41][42]. The classification perfor-
mance obtained by SVM is influenced by the choice of proper values for their
free parameters. Biologically inspired algorithms can be used as optimization
techniques to select the proper values of the free parameters of SVM.
A better improvement for SVM classification can be achieved by utilizing
Cognitive computation algorithm such as Cognitive Diagnosis Algorithm that
was proposed in [18] or utilizing bio-inspired algorithms such as Genetic Al-
gorithm (GA) and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) for features selection
process.
Utilizing an efficient features selection techniques to select the significant
features that are related to RA flooding attack will have a positive impact on
the detection accuracy. As a result, it will assist the network administrators
to take the right action to contain the presence of RA flooding attacks in the
IPv6 network.
6 Conclusion and Future work
A machine-learning-based technique to detect RA flooding attacks was pro-
posed. The proposed technique consists of three phases. The filtering phase
filters the related RA flooding attack protocols and features. The feature inter-
section phase, which is based on IGR and PCA, selects the best features that
can highly contribute to detecting RA flooding attacks. The detection phase,
which is based on SVM, creates a training model to detect the RA flood-
ing attacks. Three different simulated datasets were generated to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed technique in detecting RA flooding attacks. In
addition, the effect of the feature reduction phase on the accuracy of detect-
ing RA flooding attacks was evaluated. The results showed that the proposed
technique is sufficiently accurate to detect RA flooding attacks. The feature
reduction phase exerts a positive effect and contributes significantly to the
detection of RA flooding attacks.
Future work can focus on increasing the accuracy of the proposed technique
by using another well-trained model generated by more efficient training al-
gorithms. In addition, different Dimensionality Reduction algorithms such as
Large-margin Weakly Supervised Dimensionality Reduction (LWSDR) and Di-
mensionality Reduction with Subspace Structure Preservation (DRSSP), can
be evaluated to assess their impact on the accuracy detection of training algo-
rithms. Furthermore, more biologically-inspired machine learning algorithms
such as Deep Learning [43], Genetic Algorithms and Particle Swarm Opti-
mization algorithms [44] can also be utilized, as these have been proven to be
highly efficient in features selection and classification. Moreover, the scope of
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our proposed approaches can be extended to the detection of other NDP-based
attacks.
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